


Piloting Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems

2 March 2011

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
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What is NISTIR 7622 ?


NIST Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIRs):

- Describes research of a technical nature of interest to a specialized audience.
- Includes interim or final reports on work performed by NIST for outside sponsors (both government and nongovernment).
- May also report results of NIST projects of transitory or limited interest, including those that will be published subsequently in more comprehensive form.



What is NISTIR 7622 ? (con't)

- Guidance and recommended risk mitigating strategies for the acquiring federal agency only.
 - NISTIR 7622 is not meant to be comprehensive.
- A set of practices to be used for **HIGH-IMPACT LEVEL SYSTEMS** (FIPS 199) – medium-impact dependent upon risk management approach.



NISTIR 7622 – What It Provides


- Roles and responsibilities.
- Best practices to augment baseline security controls.
- Helps determine which procurements should consider supply chain risk.
- Describes how to work with a supply chain risk management team to mitigate risk through careful security specifications and contract requirement.
- Looks at risks in the full lifecycle of COTS & GOTS.
 - Design, development, acquisition, system integration, system operation, and disposal.
- Serves a broad audience.
 - System owners, acquisition staff, system security personnel, system engineers, etc.



NISTIR 7622 – What It Does **NOT** Do


➤ NISTIR 7622 DOES **NOT** Provide:

- Specific contract language.
- Threat assessments.
- A complete list of supply chain assurance methods and techniques that mitigate supply chain threats.



SCRM Terms

- **Supply Chain** – The set of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources for creating and moving a product or service (including its sub-elements) from suppliers through to an organization’s customers.
 - *+17 definition based on participants, systems, functions, processes, objectives, etc.*
- **Element** – Includes: COTS and GOTS (software, hardware and firmware) and synonymous with components, devices, products, systems, and materials. A part of a system. Synonym for component. An element may be implemented by products or services.
- **Acquirer** - For this document, the acquirer is always a government agency (including those agencies taking on the role of integrator).
- **Integrator** – A third-party organization that specializes in combining products/elements of several suppliers to produce elements (information systems).
- **Supplier** – Third-party organization providing individual elements. *Synonymous with vendor and manufacturer; also applies to maintenance/disposal service providers.*



Document Structure

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. Implementing Supply Chain Risk Management**
- 3. Supply Chain Risk Management Practices**

Appendix A – Glossary

Appendix B – Acronyms


Appendix C – References




Establish a SCRM Capability

- Ad-hoc or formal team.
- Develop policy and procedures.
 - Determine who performs requirement analysis, makes risk decisions, prepares procurement related documents, and specifies any specific training requirements.

Implementation – SCRM Approach



Integrated SCRM Procurement Process






Supply Chain Practices

➤ Topic areas include:

- Procurement
- Design/Development
- Testing
- Operational
- Personnel


➤ 21 varying practices:

- Acquirer: Programmatic and validation activities
- Supplier or integrator: General, technical and validation requirements.
- Assumes the organization has a developed and implemented robust information security program.
- Cover complete system development life cycle.



Supply Chain Risk Management Practices

- 3.1: Maximize Acquirer's Visibility into Integrators and Suppliers**
- 3.2: Protect Confidentiality of Element Uses**
- 3.3: Incorporate Supply Chain Assurance in Requirements**
- 3.4: Select Trustworthy Elements**
- 3.5: Enable Diversity**
- 3.6: Identify and Protect Critical Processes and Elements**
- 3.7: Use Defensive Design**
- 3.8: Protect the Supply Chain Environment**
- 3.9: Configure Elements to Limit Access and Exposure**
- 3.10: Formalize Service/Maintenance**
- 3.11: Test Throughout the System Development Lifecycle**
- 3.12: Manage Configuration**
- 3.13: Consider Personnel in the Supply Chain**
- 3.14: Promote Awareness, Educate, and Train Personnel on Supply Chain Risk**
- 3.15: Harden Supply Chain Delivery Mechanisms**
- 3.16: Protect/Monitor/Audit Operational System**
- 3.17: Negotiate Requirements Changes**
- 3.18: Manage Supply Chain Vulnerabilities**
- 3.19: Reduce Supply Chain Risks during Software Updates and Patches**
- 3.20: Respond to Supply Chain Incidents**
- 3.21: Reduce Supply Chain Risks During Disposal**




NISTIR 7622: Current Work

- Updating draft based on public comments
 - Define and explain problem better.
 - History, issues, purpose, what IS SCRM?
 - What are we actually asking actors to do?
 - Resources: many activities already practiced that address various disciplines, including logistics, security, reliability, safety, quality control, etc.
 - Roles and responsibilities.
 - Implementation guidance.
 - Due diligence/caveat emptor.
 - Best practices – specify foundational practices.
 - Use cases
 - Reference documentation – NIST 800 53, FIPS 199, etc.



NISTIR 7622: Future Work

- Develop a new Options Plan for future supply chain work.
- Continuing to incorporate public comments in the Draft NIST IR 7622.
- Continue to incorporate feedback from ongoing pilots in the Draft NIST IR 7622.
- Investigate the possibility of utilizing various supply chain tools to help manage relationships.
- Continue to meet with private and public sector stakeholders to obtain additional input into Draft NIST IR 7622.
- Workshop – contingent upon budget and availability of funds.
- **Open to suggestions.**



Thank you

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